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contract Statement of Work is explored, and a background on
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provided. The conclusions yield that the post-award problems
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Contracting out for services is an integral part of con-
ducting business in the Department of Defense today.
According to the Director of the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP) the Government spends approximately $87 billion
a year on service contracting [Ref. l:p. 47].
Just as with contracts for material/hardware, the service
contract can have its fair share of contract related problems.
Difficulties experienced during the post-award phase usually
develop from problems associated with the pre-solicitation
phase. Many of these problems can be avoided by employing
enough foresight to plan properly in the early stages of the
contract cycle. However, not all problems can be avoided
through proper planning alone. For example, if one conducts
a thorough and conscientious requirements determination
process, and then fails to accurately incorporate these
requirements into the Statement of Work (SOW) , the drafter has
nullified the effort spent on planning. Additionally, since
the SOW is the primary document from which the service
contract is drawn, it would be difficult if not impossible to
avoid problems resulting from a poorly written contract.
Combine this situation with lack of proper guidance during
contract administration, and one has the potential for abuse.
According to the OFPP, common problems found with service
contracts result from:
* Unnecessarily vague statements of work, which increase
costs or make it difficult to control costs;
* Insufficient use of fixed price and incentive fee pricing
arrangements for repetitive requirements, resulting in
increased costs and inadequate incentive to improve
performance; and
* Nonexistent or inadequate contract administration plans
which lead to unauthorized commitments by the Government
and delayed contract completion. [Ref. 2:p. 1]
This thesis is somewhat controversial, in that it involves
a case study performed on a service contract that was subject
to an investigation by the Marine Corps. The investigation
was a product of several "HOTLINE" calls and a letter to a
U.S. Congressional Representative concerning the contract.
Therefore, certain names will not be associated with positions
held, due to the possible impact that it may have on pending
appeals.
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of this research is to perform a compre-
hensive study on an existing, near term, technical service
support contract within the Marine Corps, in order to
ascertain the problems associated with the contract and
ultimately develop "lessons learned" for consideration when
planning for contracts of this nature. Although many service
contracts share common problems, this case study may provide
lessons learned on problems unique to the particular contract




This thesis is a case study of the ORINCON technical
service contract performed at the Marine Corps Tactical
Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA) , Camp Pendleton, California.
This contract is one of three performed at MCTSSA and was
selected for study by the researcher due to it being the most
complete of the three. The study focuses on all phases of
the contract cycle beginning with the requirements determina-
tion phase and ending with contract administration. The
contract had been extended on a monthly basis to allow time
for recompetition, therefore "Contract Closeout" was not
considered as an area for study.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What were the principal problems experienced during
the performance of the ORINCON service contract and how might
these problems be avoided in future service contracts?
2. Subsidiary Thesis Questions
a. What is a Services Statement of Work and how is it
prepared?
b. What were the requirements, who determined them
and how were they developed for this contract?
c. What was the overall plan (including milestones)
for this contract and to what extent did actual execution of
the contract meet this plan?
d. How effectively were modifications implemented on
this contract?
e» What changes could be made to future solicitations
for services contracts to enhance effectiveness?
E . METHODOLOGY
Preliminary research included an in-depth analysis of the
contract case file including the Request For Proposal (RFP)
with Statement of Work (SOW) , Pre and Post Business
Memorandums, the contract itself, contract modifications, and
memorandums to the record pertaining to the administration of
the contract. In addition, existing Government regulations,
orders, instructions, and policy guidance letters, were
researched.
Fact-finding sessions and interviews with individuals
directly involved with the contract were conducted. In
addition, a questionnaire was used as an interview tool where
it was determined that there was insufficient time available
for a complete response. The questionnaire was also useful
where the person interviewed wanted to remain anonymous.
F. DEFINITIONS
The following terms and definitions are applicable to
concepts used in this study:
1. Commercial Activities (CA)
A function either contracted out or performed by a
Government Activity that provides a service or product that
could be obtained from a private source [Ref. 3:p. 9]. A
Commercial Activity must:
... be separable from other functions in order to be
suitable for performance either in-house or by contract,
and a regularly scheduled activity of short duration
associated with support of a particular project. [Ref.
4: pp. 1-2]
2. Government Function
A function so closely related to the public interest
that it must be performed by Government employees.
3. Statement of Work (SOW)
A document that describes accurately the essential and
technical requirements for items, materials or services
including the standards used to determine whether the
requirements have been met. [Ref. 5:p. 4] The SOW describes
the effort required of the contractor and addresses peripheral
issues such as describing the data that the contractor must
deliver to the Government. The SOW is the principal document
from which the contract is drawn.
4. Personal Services Contract
A personal services contract is characterized by the
employer-employee relationship it creates between the
Government and the contractor's personnel. The Government
is normally required to obtain its employees by direct
hire under competitive appointment or other procedures
required by the civil service laws. Obtaining personal
services by contract, rather than by direct hire,
circumvents those laws unless Congress has specifically
authorized acquisition of the services by contract. [Ref.
6:p. 37-1]
5. Technical Service Contract
A service contract where the contractor is providing
technical support such as software development, engineering
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support, etc., as opposed to less technical oriented services
such as food, janitorial, fire protection or security
services.
6. 100% Set-Aside
This is a term used to describe a contract that has
been totally set aside for award to small businesses.
7. Government Furnished Property
All property owned by or leased to the Government or
acquired by the Government under the terms of the contract.
[Ref. 6:p. 45-1]
8. Contractor-acquired Property
Property procured or otherwise provided by the
contractor for the performance of a contract, title to which
is vested in the Government. [Ref. 6:p. 45-1]
9. Job Analysis
The act of looking at a job as it is being done in-
house or by a contractor to determine what actually results.
Job analysis looks at organization, workload, performance
values, and resources. [Ref. 5:p. 2]
10. Surveillance Plan
An organized written document used for quality assurance
surveillance. The document contains sampling guides,
checklists, and decision tables. [Ref. 5:p. 4]
11. Tree Diagram
A visual representation of the major functions
performed by a system which shows logical parts and subparts.
[Ref. 5:p. 4]
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A visual representation of the major functions
performed by a system which shows logical parts and subparts.
[Ref. 5:p. 4]
6. THESIS ORGANIZATION
There are six chapters in this thesis. These chapters are
structured such that the reader can logically follow the
development of the technical service contract and its
associated problems, beginning with the requirements deter-
mination phase, following through to contract administration.
Chapter II presents a brief background on contracting for
goods and services within the U.S. Government. In addition,
the Statement of Work is defined and guidelines for construct-
ing the SOW are presented.
Chapter III introduces the Government activities involved
with the development and administration of the contract.
Specifically addressed are:
1. MCTSSA's background and their relationship to higher
headquarters and the project manager.
2. The supported project, Unit Level Circuit Switch (ULCS)
.
3. The PCO, ACO, and the COTR.
Chapter IV contains an evolution of the ORINCON contract.
Chapter V presents the identification and analysis of the
problems with interpretations from various parties; and
Chapter VI contains the researcher's conclusions and
recommendations for future contracts of this nature.
II. BACKGROUND ON 8ERVICE CONTRACTING
A. HISTORY
Since the ending of the Second World War the amount of
contracting for goods and services within the United States
has increased significantly. There has been concern over
Government competition with the private sector in providing
these goods and services which dates back to the 1930 's. A
special committee from the House of Representatives (HoR)
reviewed the current situation in 1932 and reported their
findings relative to the competition issue. The committee
reported that many of the activities the Government performed
were of a commercial or industrial nature and that they should
be terminated. In addition, the committee recommended that a
permanent committee be established to control competition with
private industry. Specifically, the report of the HoR
committee recommended that:
. . . the heads of the several departments of Government
be directed to order immediate investigation of any
activities competitive with private business carried on by
their representative departments, and report to Congress
their conclusions as to their effectiveness from the
standpoint of cost, economy, and public policy, to the end
that there may be liquidation of all such bureaus, sub-
divisions or agencies under their control competing with
private trade, commerce, finance, industry, or the profes-
sions, the operations of which are not in the public
interest. [Ref. 7]
The concern over the Government competing with private
industry did not receive Executive Agency support until 1954
when President Eisenhower first attempted to establish a
Government policy of placing reliance on the private sector
for the supply of goods and services. Technology produced by
the American private sector was state of the art, so it was
sound policy to have agencies rely on private industry to
produce the same results for equipment and services used by
the Federal Government. In addition, President Eisenhower
felt that in most circumstances, private industry was able to
produce more efficiently than the Government. This policy was
formally promulgated by the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) in
their Bulletin 55-4, the first of several bulletins on the
subject. The policy stated:
It is the general policy of the administration that the
Federal Government will not start or carry on any
commercial activity to provide a service or product for
its own use if such a product or service can be procured
from private enterprise through ordinary business
channels.
Exceptions to this policy should be made by the head of an
agency only where it is clearly demonstrated in each case
that it is not in the public interest to procure such
product or service from private enterprise. [Ref . 8: para.
2]
This newly stated policy compelled all agencies and
departments within the Federal Government to assess their own
operations, as well as their capabilities, to determine if any
commercial or industrial activities that were currently being
performed should be contracted out or maintained in-house.
Additional guidance was provided by the BOB (Bulletin 57-
7,1957) pertaining to the initiation, evaluating, and the
ending of Federal Government commercial activities. Once
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again the content of this bulletin reflected the policy of
contracting with the commercial sector for goods and services.
However, there were exceptions to this policy, that were not
published until 1959.
In September, 1959, the BOB published another bulletin
(60-2) which provided certain exceptions to the policy of
relying on the commercial sector. Referring to inherently
Governmental functions, there were some circumstances which
prohibited the Government from contracting out certain
activities. The following exceptions apply:
1. Activities that involve National Security.
2
.
Activities that would obviously cost more to contract
out.
3 Activities that would be clearly unfeasible due to
administrative, mission, or availability reasons.
This bulletin further mandated that cost comparisons be
conducted to preclude procuring services from the private
sector, where overall cost to the Government would be higher
than if the function was performed in-house.
The language in Bulletin 60-2, used in describing the
above exceptions, was vague and allowed subjective interpreta-
tion. In 1966 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
issued OMB Circular A-76 that clarified the intentions of the
policy makers. This new directive stated that:
The guidelines in this circular are the furtherance of the
government's general policy of relying on the private
enterprise system to supply its needs ... in some
instances, however it is in the National interest for the
Government to provide directly the products and services
it uses. [Ref. 9: para. 2]
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Clarification was provided on what circumstances warranted the
providing of goods and services by a Government agency. These
conditions were:
a. Procurement of a product or service from a commercial
source would disrupt or materially delay an agency's
program.
b. It is necessary for the Government to conduct a commer-
cial or industrial activity for purposes of combat
support or for individual and unit training of military
personnel or to maintain or strengthen mobilization
readiness.
c. A satisfactory commercial source is not available and
cannot be developed in time to provide a product or
service when it is needed.
d. The product is available from another federal agency.
e. Procurement of the product or service from a commercial
source will result in higher cost to the Government.
[Ref. 9]
Despite this clarification, there were agencies that
criticized A-7 6 as ineffective, and that it only created
needless controversy and concern. Implementation of A-76 was
delayed due to resistance by departments within the executive
branch. In addition, there existed a lack of incentives to
comply. This led to a comprehensive review of the A-76
circular in 1977, and on March 29, 1979, a new edition of the
circular was issued. Continuous emphasis was placed on cost
issues and price related exceptions. OMB published a cost
comparison handbook which became "Supplement No.l to OMB
Circular No. A-76: Policies for Acquiring Commercial or
Industrial Products and Services Needed by the Government."
The handbook reported that "Circular A-76 guidelines were too
11
general to achieve desirable uniformity and were insufficient
as a basis for comprehensive cost studies." [Ref. 10:Ch. l.c]
The purpose of this handbook is as follows:
. . . to provide detailed instructions for developing a
comprehensive and valid comparison of the estimated cost
to the Government of acquiring a product or service by
contract and of providing it with in-house Government
resources. This Handbook is intended to establish
consistency, assurance that all substantive factors are
considered when making cost comparisons, and a desirable
level of uniformity among agencies in comparative cost
analysis. [Ref. 10:Ch. l.b]
Emphasis on the commitment to reduce costs and not
infringe upon private enterprise was continued through the
years during the Reagan Presidency. Beginning in 1981, the
Director of OMB initiated yet another analysis, this time
reviewing cost comparison methodology with an objective to
streamline it and make it more efficient. On August 4, 1983,
another supplement was issued and subtitled: "Performance of
Commercial Activities." This supplement reflected the changes
made to clarify the procedures and streamline the methodology.
The supplement was divided into four parts: Part I - Policy
Implementation; Part II- Writing Performance Work Statements;
Part III- Management Study Guide; and Part IV - Cost Compar-
ison Handbook (which superseded the earlier version) . Once
published, agencies were mandated to comply with all elements
of the new supplement. As the 1980s progressed, OMB has
maintained the Circular by issuing Transmittal Memorandums
updating information on conducting cost comparisons.
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The emphasis to rely on the private sector for goods and
services continued. Former President Reagan expressed his
support for policies that increased reliance on the private
sector. In the latter half of his term, it was more practical
to contract out for services than to try to increase the DoD
manpower level where ceilings on the number of personnel are
determined by Congress.
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOW AND HOW IT SHOULD BE DEVELOPED
Services are defined as the performance of identifiable
tasks , rather than the delivery of a particular product or end
item [Ref. ll:p. 1]. In order for the Government to receive
the type and quality of service that is desired, there must be
a means for indicating this in the contract. The SOW is the
tool that defines this requirement. Therefore, developing the
SOW is an integral part of contracting for services because
the SOW becomes the foundation of the contractual document
itself.
The acquisition of services for technical support requires
a different approach to contracting than hardware, the primary
difference being the SOW. Therefore, it is important that the
proper amount of effort be expended in preparing the SOW. A
fine line exists between what should and what should not be
incorporated in the SOW. It is often a difficult task to
determine where this fine line exists. In solving this
problem, the drafter should focus on what work should be
13
performed and not how to perform the work. Caution must be
taken to ensure that the SOW does not appear vague to either
the Government or the contractor. A poorly written SOW
provides the possibility of misinterpretation that can lead to
difficulties during contract administration. In addition, the
SOW must be understood by all parties. If not, many problems
can arise concerning cost, quality, and other post-award
problems.





3. Writing the Surveillance Plan [Ref. 5:p. 17]
The first phase is called Job Analysis . It is during this
phase that the analyst determines the performance required by
the contractor by proceeding through a step-by-step process.
This process enables the analyst to gather all of the essen-
tial information needed to write a performance oriented SOW.
It also helps to establish the baseline that will enable the
Government to determine the quality of the contractor's output
service. [Ref. 5:p. 17]
There are eight steps to the Job Analysis process. These
are:
Step 1. Organization . At this point the particular
service function is analyzed to observe how it is organized
and what kind of service is actually provided. This organi-
zational analysis provides the framework for determining what
14
is normally accomplished by the organization. [Ref . 5:p. 17]
Step 2. Tree Diagram . Once the organizational analysis
is complete, the analyst must combine the individual services
together to present a logical flow of activities similar to a
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) . The tool used for this is
called the tree diagram. The tree diagram resembles a
standard organizational chart, except that it shows each task
that happens rather than who performs the task. [Ref. 5:p.
17]
Step 3. Activity Analysis . Each box in the tree diagram
is separately analyzed to define the outputs of the individual
processes. The analysis consists of three major sections:
input, work and output. [Ref. 5: p. 20]
Step 4. Classification . By conducting the preceding
steps, the analyst becomes familiar with the total job, but
not all of the sub-jobs or tasks will be included in the SOW.
It is during this step that the analyst works with program
management to decide which jobs will be included. No further
work will be required on those tasks not included in the SOW.
[Ref. 5:p. 20]
Step 5. Data Gathering . During this step, workload data
and resource data are required on the services that will be
contracted out. Workload data are that information on how
often output services are provided. Historical information is
modified with any projected changes to reach an estimated
workload. Resources needed to perform the work are then
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calculated. These resources fall into one of the following
subcategories: personnel, facilities, equipment, or material.
[Ref. 5:p. 22]
Step 6. Performance Analysis . Performance values are
assigned for each of the services to be performed. These
values have three components: The first is the performance
indicator which is a certain measurable characteristic of the
service. The second component is the standard value
associated with the indicator while the third component is the
Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) which is expressed as a
percentage. The AQL is the maximum deviation level from the
standard, realizing that occasional failures will occur [Ref.
5:p. 26]. However, the current focus has been on replacing
the standard of accepting certain levels of deviation, by
applying a concept known as Statistical Process Control (SPC) .
SPC concentrates on the eventual elimination of all failures
through continuous improvement of the processes.
Step 7. Governing Directives . Various Government direc-
tives or instructions that apply to the services to be pro-
vided are listed here. The goal is to minimize the number of
directives listed, and to classify them as either mandatory or
optional. [Ref. 12:p. 23]
Step 8. Deduct Analysis . If the Government does not
receive the service according to the contract, the contractor
is not paid. It is during this final step that the decision
on how much to deduct is determined. "The amount deducted
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must represent as nearly as possible the cost of the service
foregone." [Ref. 5: p. 32] The analyst therefore prepares an
estimate of the contractor's cost for each service and
expresses them as a percentage of the total contract cost.
"If the work is not done satisfactorily, the value of the work
can be withheld." [Ref. 12 :p. 24]
Phase two of the SOW preparation is called the Writing
Phase . If a detailed job analysis was performed this should
make writing the SOW relatively easy. To ensure a smooth
writing process, an outline must be developed to provide
structure for the document. The major sections that provide
the basis for the outline are listed as follows:
* General . This section provides a broad overview to the
SOW.
* Definitions . This section includes all special terms and
phrases used in the SOW and will help eliminate
misunderstandings
.
* Government -Furnished Property and Services . Any
property that the Government provides the contractor is
identified here.
* Contractor Furnished Items . Here the analyst describes
material and equipment that the contractor must provide.
* Specific Tasks . The work done during the Job Analysis
phase makes its way into this section.
* Applicable Technical Orders .
* Technical exhibits . [Ref. 5:pp. 35-36]
The style and language used in writing a SOW are the
analyst's key to avoiding ambiguity and misinterpretation.
The analyst must take technical information and word it in
such a fashion that will include all essential information yet
17
remain in the simplest form. In addition, the analyst must
use language that permits readability and is clear to all who
should read the document. As would be imagined, this comes
only with experience, therefore, as the Procuring Contracting
Officer at Camp Pendleton states "it is wise to have second
person reviews by other personnel within the drafter's
organization to check for the obvious and not so obvious."
[Ref. 13]
The third phase, writing the Surveillance Plan , is
designed to ensure that the Government maintains an active
role in contract management through a systematic contract
administration procedure. The goal of this plan is to
determine if the contractor is meeting the requirements of the
contract, in terms of quality and quantity.
There are three steps involved in the development of the
Surveillance Plan. These are:
1. Identify key performance indicators
2. Identify information sources, and
3. Develop tools to facilitate measurement.
While the surveillance plan deals primarily with quality
related factors, it could also include any number of proce-
dural checks that would aid in the administration of the
contract, thus ensuring proper performance of the contractor.
18
III. THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AND THEIR REQUIREMENT
FOR THIS SERVICE CONTRACT
This chapter introduces the Government agencies and their
specific responsibilities, in order to give the reader the
background to fully appreciate the requirement for the
contract, and its associated problems.
A. MARINE CORPS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION COMMAND
(MCRDAC)
MCRDAC is a relatively new command that was established by
the Commandant of the Marine Corps on 18 November 1987. Prior
to that time there existed a complicated process for deter-
minating requirements within the Marine Corps that involved
staffing among a number of different Commands and Departments
at Headquarters, in Washington, DC. This resulted in lengthy
program initiation and produced a forced consensus, rather
than a focused response to the needs of the Commanders within
the Marine Corps. In addition, there was an absence of
clearly defined lines of authority and responsibility for
systems acquisition. Realizing that there were clear
inefficiencies in the organizations responsible for the
acquisition process, General Gray set out to streamline the
system in order to accomplish one of his top goals, which was
to get the best equipment into the hands of Marines in the
shortest possible time. To improve the situation he directed
the establishment of two major field Commands from existing
19
assets, one of which was MCRDAC. [The other Command created,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) is responsible
for, among other things, developing the various requirements
for submission to MCRDAC] . By establishing MCRDAC the
Commandant created a single organization accountable for all
tactical systems acquisition. MCRDAC incorporated personnel
from the Marine Corps Development and Education Command
(MCDEC) , Material Division, Installations and Logistics
Department, Headquarters Marine Corps and job billets from
other activities previously involved in acquisition matters.
The mission of MCRDAC, simply stated, involves taking a
validated requirement for ground combat equipment and turning
it into reality. This is done by researching existing
technologies. If the technology exists to satisfy the
requirement, then MCRDAC would procure. If it did not exist
then MCRDAC would develop it.
Since the creation of MCRDAC in 1987, the Marine Corps has
found ways to further streamline its newest Command. This
resulted in additional organizational changes. The current
organizational structure of MCRDAC is identified in Figure 1.
B. THE PROGRAM MANAGER (PM)
As the CG, MCCDC acts as the Commandant's agent in
developing requirements, the CG, MCRDAC acts as the agent in
acquiring the systems that fulfill those requirements. The
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Manager (PM) . The PM is the principal of the entire system
acquisition process. The PM is responsible for transforming
the requirement from concept to an operational piece of
equipment. The PM has four major responsibilities, these are:
1) Cost, 2) Schedule, 3) Performance, and 4) Supportability.
In the broadest sense, the PM must manage a program within
budget and schedule, ensure a weapon system will perform as
intended, and is logistically supportable upon fielding to the
Fleet.
Consistent with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, MCRDAC was
reorganized to allow for no more than two reporting layers
between the PM and the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE)
.
The PM responsible for developing the requirements for this
service contract is the PM, Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) Command and Control (C2) . (See Fig. 1) This PM, one
of eight at MCRDAC, reports directly to the CG, MCRDAC, who is
the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for the Marine Corps. The
PEO then reports to the Commandant [the Service Acquisition
Executive (SAE) ] , who in turn, reports to the DAE, thus
abiding by the G-N Act.
The PM, MAGTF C2 has five Deputy Project Managers (DPM)
under his cognizance who are responsible for various systems
under their control, Fig. 2. The DPM responsible for the

























MAGTF C2 Office Structure
The Comm/Nav is an umbrella system which covers many other
smaller systems or sub-systems. The DPM assigns assistant PMs
to oversee the sub-system programs. This Assistant PM (APM)
is responsible for various projects within the respective sub-
system and reports directly to the DPM COMM/NAV. The
cognizant APM in this case is the APM, Switching Systems.
Each sub-system (i.e., Switching Systems) is made up of
various different projects each led by a Project Officer (PO) .




C. THE ULCS PROJECT
The ULCS is a family of tactical circuit switches designed
to satisfy tactical user communication needs through and
beyond the transition from analog switched systems to
integrate, all digital secure systems. It is a fully
automatic system with subscriber features common to modern
electronic switching equipment, i.e., telephone switchboard.
These switching systems are typically employed at the
Regimental/Group level and above. The Marine Corps is the
lead service for procurement of the ULCS. A full scale
development contract for hardware was awarded to ITTACD in
1978, and the production contract was awarded to ITTACD on 30
September, 1986. The ULCS is a software driven communication
switching system. The test bed organization responsible for
the development/improvement of the system software is the
Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA)
.
D. MCTSSA
MCTSSA is the Marine Corps' sole tactical software support
activity. MCTSSA provides design, developmental, test,
evaluation and life cycle software support for Marine Corps
tactical Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
(C3I) systems that use embedded computers (i.e., ULCS).
MCTSSA is a subordinate activity of MCRDAC and is located at
Camp Pendleton, California. The MCRDAC organizational changes
mentioned in the first section of this chapter had no direct
impact on MCTSSA' s mission statement or functions during that
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time. However, due to the growth in the number of projects
assigned to MCTSSA by MCRDAC, their responsibilities grew
significantly. In the year 1989 MCTSSA's mission was to
provide post-deployment support of tactical software and
firmware for tactical data systems, designated by the
Commandant of the Marine Corps and to serve as the Marine
Corps' principal activity for the conduct of tactical software
testing. Additionally, MCTSSA was to conduct testing of
assault amphibians and associated equipment. The various
functions of MCTSSA at that time were as follows:
* Provide post-deployment tactical software support for
designated systems.
* Provide post-deployment tactical software configuration
control and configuration status accounting for
designated systems.
* Provide support to Fleet Marine Force units using
tactical data systems in accordance with Marine Corps
Order 4130.2.
* Determine the resources required to perform the assigned
mission, including life cycle software support planning
for designated systems.
* Evaluate designated systems under development to
determine post deployment software supportability.
* Perform developmental testing and evaluation of
designated tactical data systems and communication-
electronics equipment.
* Provide hardware and software maintenance support of
systems and equipment assigned for developmental test and
evaluation.
* Assist in conducting operational testing and evaluation
of designated tactical data systems and communication-
electronics equipment when directed.
* Perform analysis of Unserviceable Equipment Reports,
recommendations for equipment and software improvements,
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and prototype Engineering Change Proposals for designated
systems
.
* Act as the Marine Corps Participation Test Unit for Joint
Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
(JINTACS) testing and participate in other intra-
interoperability testing when directed.
* Conduct developmental testing and combined developmental
and operational control of assault amphibians and
associated equipment.
As time progressed, so did the mission and functions of
MCTSSA. New projects requiring software development and
support were added to the roles of MCTSSA. With the change in
responsibility came the change to their mission statement.
The current mission statement for the Activity's Table of
Organization (T/0) reads:
[To] Ensure integrity, operability, and supportability of
assigned tactical software systems throughout their life
cycle to sustain combat readiness in the Fleet Marine
Forces (FMF) . [Ref. 14]
Many of the functions of MCTSSA have evolved as well. The
current functions are listed as:
* Provide technical and managerial support for designated
tactical software systems throughout their system life
cycle.
* Provide post deployment software support for designated
systems
* Provide acquisition support for tactical systems from the
conceptual phase through production and deployment.
Assist in the development of software requirements
specifications to support and test hardware and software.
Perform duties as the software Logistics Element Manager
(LEM) on systems designated by MCRDAC.
* Certify the adequacy of software Quality Assurance (QA)
,
Configuration Management (CM) , test plans and procedures,
adherence to specifications and suitability of software
products for systems designated by MCRDAC Program Manager
(PM).
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* Develop, perform, and/or assist in the actual systems
testing, test evaluation, and QA audits for systems
designated by MCRDAC PM's.
* Provide software CM for designated software systems; to
include identification, control procedures, recording and
reporting changed to Computer Software Configuration
Items (CSCI) . Provide management of CM libraries.
* Provide software QA management of designated tactical
software systems.
* Provide hardware and software systems engineering, inte-
gration, interface design and systems prototyping as
directed. Perform software engineering design to improve
readiness or enhance mission performance of systems
designated by MCRDAC. Participate in the MCRDAC
Configuration Control Boards (CCB) to implement changes.
* Act as the Marine Corps participation test Unit for the
(JINTACCS) testing and participate in other inter/intra-
operability testing when directed.
* Perform interoperability analysis functions and partici-
pate in the Marine Corps Interoperability Configuration
Control Board (ICCB)
.
* Develop and maintain the Computer Resources Life Cycle
Management Plan (CRLCMP) , transition plans, CM and QA
procedures/plans, and test plans for the tactical soft-
ware systems the MCTSSA has been designated as the
Software Support Activity.
* Perform analysis and recommendations of Quality
Deficiency Reports, Unserviceable Equipment Reports,
Program Change Requests, Product Improvement Programs,
and Engineering Change Proposals/Software Engineering
Change Proposal for designated systems. Designation may
come from MCRDAC or Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany,
Ga.
* Provide contact teams as requested to assist the Fleet
Marine Force.
The T/0 for MCTSSA allows for 219 military and 198
civilian personnel, each assigned a specific position within
the Activity. While Congress places a ceiling on the number
of military and civilian end strength, this does not apply to
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contract personnel. MCTSSA did not have, nor could they hire
or recruit the personnel that would be required to support the
ULCS effort and other tasks assigned by MCRDAC. It was for
this reason that it became necessary to contract out for the
necessary technical support. Since the tasks to be performed
were not inherently Government functions, MCTSSA could
contract out for the technical services.
MCTSSA is commanded by a Marine Corps Colonel and is
comprised of five separate Divisions (including a Headquarters
Div.), each with their own unique responsibilities. The
Communication/Intelligence Systems Division (Comm/Intel) has
the responsibility for the ULCS software development and
support. The Orincon contract was originally developed to
support the ULCS project. Due to the growth in the number of
projects assigned to the Comm/Intel Division, the scope of the
contract was eventually expanded to cover support of these
additional projects as well. Other projects that were
eventually supported by this contract are:
1. Unit Level Tactical Data Switch (ULTDS)
2. Fiber Optic Cable System (FOCS)
3. Communication Control (COMMCON)
4
.
Message Text Format Editor (MTF Editor)
E. THE CONTRACTING OFFICER'S TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE (COTR)
The COTR acts as the Contracting Officer's representative
for technical matters, providing technical direction to the
contractor regarding the SOW, issues technical task directives
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when authorized, and monitors the progress and quality of
contractor performance. Additionally, the COTR serves as the
contact through which the contractor can relay questions and
problems of a technical nature to the Contracting Officer.
The COTR is not an Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO)
and does not have the authority to take any action, either
directly or indirectly, that would change the pricing,
quality, place-of-performance, delivery schedule, or any other
terms and conditions of the basic contract. In other words,
the COTR does not have the authority to direct the accomplish-
ment of effort which goes beyond the scope of the basic
contractual statement of work.
The responsibilities of the COTR can be overwhelming. The
duties and responsibilities that were assigned to the initial
COTR for ORINCON contract were as follows:
* Issue Task Orders, if authorized in the contract.
* Signing all technical instructions to the contractor to
assure all work is performed within the scope of the
contract, and forward copies to the Administrative
Contracting Officer. (Note: the term "technical
instructions" is used to refer to technical instructions,
technical direction and task assignments)
.
* Receiving and reviewing copies of all correspondence with
the contractor concerning technical instructions to
assure that the scope of work is not altered.
* Ensuring that all technical instructions or understand-
ings reached with regard to the specifications or SOW are
formalized in writing prior to the contractor commencing
work on a particular task. In urgent situations, the
contractor may be given oral technical instructions, but
these must be immediately followed up in writing.
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* Reviewing and evaluating contractor's proposals in order
to furnish the Contracting Officer comments and recom-
mendations.
* Assisting in negotiation of supplemental agreements
incorporating contractor proposals.
* Attending post-award conferences when requested by the
contracting officer.
* Assuring contractor's compliance with safety require-
ments .
* Ensuring that inefficient or wasteful methods are not
being utilized on fixed price, cost reimbursement, time
and material, or labor-hour contracts. Ensuring that
percentage of work complete corresponds with percentage
of funds expended.
* Ensuring that all Government technical interface with
contractor goes through the COTR office.
* Ensuring that trip reports of all Government personnel
visiting contractor's plant are forwarded to the
Contracting Officer for placement in the contract file.
* Ensuring that a copy of all Government technical
correspondence is forwarded to the Contracting Officer
for placement in the contract file.
* Monitoring monthly invoices and comparing against monthly
cost charts. Reporting any discrepancies so the
Contracting Officer can arrange for an audit by the
cognizant Defense Audit Agency.
* Alerting Contracting Officer to any potential contractual
problems
.
* Determining causative factors or any slippage in the
performance schedule.
* Reporting slippage to the Contracting Officer and making
recommendations for corrective action to eliminate the
cause of the stoppage.
* Monitoring contractor's performance to assure that the
contractor is complying with corrective action implemen-
ted by the Contracting Officer.
* Promptly furnishing the Contracting Officer any requests
for change, deviation, or waiver (whether generated by
Government personnel or contractor personnel)
.
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Furnishing all supporting paperwork in connection with
change, deviation or waiver in a timely manner.
* Maintaining close liaison with DCAA to Obtain results of
floor checks performed by DCAA. Floor checks determine
that direct charged employees are actually present and
working on the job and that the time is properly charged.
DCAA determines the frequency and scope of floor checks
based on results of prior reviews, reliance that can be
place on contractor's systems, and any other circum-
stances which would indicate a floor check is needed.
COTRs are encouraged to participate in floor checks, and
when deemed necessary to conduct floor checks on their
own after consultation with DCAA. Floor checks should be
conducted at least quarterly, and under conditions likely
to represent the contractor's typical performance.
* Being responsible for inspection and acceptance of
services.
* Avoiding any action with regard to the contractor or its
performance that would result in the receipt of personal
services. Personal service occurs when contractor
personnel are used as if they were government employees.
* Avoid taking any action, either directly or indirectly,
that could result in a change in the pricing, quantity,
delivery schedule, or any other terms and conditions of
the contract, or to direct the accomplishment of effort
which would exceed the scope of the contract.
* Bring to the Contracting Officer's attention, via the
Program Manager or code for whom the work is being
performed, any inefficient or wasteful method being
utilized.
* The contract will require that copies of all invoices be
submitted to the COTR. COTR approval is required prior to
payment. These should be reviewed for appropriateness
and discrepancies should be brought to the Contracting
Officer's attention.
* Maintaining a file for each contract of all technical
instructions issued, a copy of all invoices, and a record
of all deliverables received citing their disposition.
* Preparing a performance report to the Contracting Officer
upon the conclusion of the contract, detailing compliance
with requirements deliverables received for each
technical instruction and any problems associated with
the contract.
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* Providing prompt notification in writing to the Appoint-
ing Official if, for any reason, tenure as COTR is
recommended for termination and provide supporting
rationale.
* Assuring that the ACO has adequate access to on-base
contractor activity to adequately administer the
contract. [Ref. 15: p. 37]
As one can see, the COTR has a myriad of responsibilities.
If a person is assigned the COTR position as a secondary duty,
it is unlikely that all of the tasks listed above will be
attended to. In this case, the person who was assigned as the
COTR, was assigned the primary duty of Project Officer for
ULCS, within the COMM/INTEL division. In addition, the person
serving in this position had no formal training as a COTR.
This presented the atmosphere for the development of the
problems that will be identified and discussed in the next two
chapters.
F. THE PROCURING CONTRACTING OFFICER (PCO)
The purchasing branch assigned the responsibility for
writing and awarding this contract was MCRDAC purchasing,
located at the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Va.
G. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER (ACO)
The Defense Contract Administration Service Management
Area (DCASMA) San Diego, was the office assigned as the ACO
for the contract. [DCASMA has since been changed to DCMAO
(Defense Contract Management Area Operations) ] . Paragraph G.3
of the contract defines the Delegation of Authority for
Contract Administration. This reads:
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The Commander, DCASMA San Diego, San Diego California is
hereby designated as the authorized representative of the
Contracting Officer for purposes of administrating this
contract in accordance with FAR & DFARS 42.2 and 42.3
[Ref. 16]
According to the applicable sections of the FAR and DFARS
listed above, there are 66 ACO responsibilities outlined.
However, in a conversation with the Senior Administrator for
DCMAO, the only responsibility placed in the hands of their
office was to receive and make payments on contractor invoices
[Ref. 17], This task was outlined in the contract under a
separate paragraph, G.l. Therefore, the DCMAO office would
not be providing the necessary oversight as one would expect
to find according to paragraph G.2 of the contract.
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONTRACT
In this chapter, the various phases of the contract cycle
will be presented in a time-line fashion. This will complete
the background necessary to present and analyze the problems
encountered with the contract, which will be found in the next
chapter. Since the contract case files contain volumes of
information, only the relevant information pertaining to the
phases will be presented here. The phases that were
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Most of the problems associated with the contract were
encountered during the Contract Administration phase. This
was due primarily to the type of contract used, and the
parties interpretation of it.
A. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION
1 . Background
The APM for Switching Systems, identified in the
previous chapter, plans, directs, develops, and promulgates
research, development, and acquisition procedures for the
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ULCS, ULTDS, FOCS, COMMCON systems and other programs as
assigned by appropriate authorities. In order to accomplish
the missions assigned to the APM, it was necessary to ensure
that the vital software support was being accomplished on the
equipment assigned to the APM office during the development.
Originally, the ULCS project started out as a joint
program between the Army and Air Force, with the Marine Corps
being the lead Service. A decision was made to conduct all
software support effort at the Army base in Fort Monmouth, New
Jersey. Just shortly after this decision, around mid 1986,
the Army decided to withdraw from the program. This action by
the Army delayed the ULCS project considerably, since there
existed a need to establish the software support element of
the project concurrent with the development of the hardware.
On realizing that Fort Monmouth would no longer be an option,
the APM sought the next possible source for the software
support team.
After reviewing the mission and functions of MCTSSA,
MCRDAC decided that MCTSSA would be the organization to
receive these tasks. However, as was mentioned before, MCTSSA
did not have the Government personnel necessary to receive the
software and all its related hardware support, once it was
delivered from the manufacturer. According to a civilian
working for the APM at the time, there needed to be a team of
Government employees in place before delivery, "just to get up
to speed" , before any software maintenance effort could be
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accomplished. This team would be responsible for setting up
the facility, buying the right equipment, learning the machine
language, and verifying Configuration Management [Ref. 18].
Therefore, work began to transfer the civilian billets that
were established for this effort from MCDEC. In the interim,
a GM 14 was hired as the Project Officer (PO) to head the
civilian group that would become the software support element
at MCTSSA. The PO worked together with the APM on
determining the requirements for the software support effort,
realizing that even with the extra civilian billets
established at MCTSSA, they would need to contract out for the
technical support required to achieve all tasks.
2. Determining the Requirements
In generic terms, there existed a requirement to
provide management, hardware and software engineering,
testing, and software maintenance/modification aspects
peculiar to the equipment assigned to the APM. The general
requirements, which were later incorporated into the SOW as
Tasks, are listed below:
1. Configuration Management Support








In addition to these areas, there existed the requirement to
have the offeror's site located within one hour surface
commute to MCTSSA. This was necessary in order to avoid lost
work time due to travel and to eliminate excessive travel
expenses incurred by the Government. There was no formal
process involved in identifying these requirements.
3. Developing the SOW
Taking the requirements identified above, a rough
outline of a SOW was prepared. Once this was accomplished,
it was handed to another individual working out of the APM's
office. This person was charged with reviewing the SOW for
correctness and completeness. In a phone conversation the
official claimed that there were two documents that were
available to be used as a guide for developing the SOW. These
were the OFPP pamphlet #4, "How to Write Performance Work
Statements" and the MilHandbook 245B, "Preparation of
Statements of Work for R&D, . . .." However, these documents
were not referred to when this SOW was developed. The
official claimed that the best way to write a SOW, was to
gather other SOWs that were written for contracts for similar
efforts and use them as a source for the new SOW. Where exact
wording didn't apply, it would be modified to pertain to the
given situation. In other words, a form of "cut and paste"
method was used to develop the fundamental contractual
document used in a service contract. [Ref. 19]
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4. Submission of the Procurement Request (PR)
Once the final draft was prepared, it was then
submitted to the technical personnel working at MCTSSA for
their input. Once reviewed, the SOW was returned to MCRDAC
and finalized. It was then submitted to the Contracting
Officer in the form of the PR, in December, 1988.
As time progressed, the Commanding Officer of MCTSSA
and the PO worked to fill the job vacancies while they waited
for the contract award. However, during this time it became
necessary to commence work on the software maintenance, as
equipment and software was being delivered to MCTSSA. At this
point the APM needed to have a contract awarded quickly, or
the project would fall behind schedule. The APM sought to
accomplish the work during the interim by seeking the services
of a contractor doing work under a totally separate contract
at the Naval Oceanic Systems Center (NOSC) . Incidently,
ORINCON happened to be the contractor working under the NOSC
contract and possessed the necessary expertise required to
fulfill the APM's tasks. Directions were given to NOSC and
work proceeded accordingly. However, as the APM found out,
this was not an efficient way of procuring services since
NOSC charged an additional three and one half percent (3.5%)
on overhead, simply because they were managing the contract.
In addition, the extra time required to submit various tasks
through NOSC to the contractor resulted in undue delays.
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B. THE SOLICITATION PROCESS
1. The CBD Announcement
A synopsis of this requirement was announced in the
Commerce Business Daily on 25 August, 1988. The announcement
read as follows:
. . . L-ADVISORY & ASSISTANCE SERVICES in support of the
Software Life Cycle Support System .... The Marine
Corps has a requirement for software support services
needed to aid the Asst. Program Mgr for Switching Systems
under the direction of the Program Mgr for Communica-
tions/Navigation systems. Services needed shall include
technical, analytical, logistic, financial, and program
mgmt assistance, and nonpersonal services in support of
specialized requirements inherent in the software
main/mod/correction of programs and all aspects of
Software life Cycle Support throughout the development,
test, installation, fielding and deployment phases of the
life cycle. Performance of tasks will be for the Systems
Responsible Officer, Switching Programs (MCTSSA) ....
[Ref. 20:p. 4]
2. Drafting the RFP
The contracting office had received advanced notice of
the intention to submit the PR by the APM. This time-saving
tactic enabled the contracting office to get an advanced start
on the development of the RFP. Work on the RFP had actually
be completed prior to receiving the finalized SOW from the
APM. It was decided by the Contracting Officer in the early
stage of RFP development that this contract would be 100% set
aside for small business, and that the contract would be a
Cost Reimbursement Contract. In a Determination and Findings
(D&F) submitted by the Contracting Officer, justification was
given for the cost type contract accordingly:
Specific tasks shall be assigned and may include any task
or combination of tasks described in the SOW. The tasks
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represent what can be anticipated and are intended to
convey the general scope and depth of the requirements
rather that specifics .... Due to the uncertainties
involved in contract performance, it is not possible to
estimate costs with sufficient accuracy to use any type of
fixed price contract. [Ref. 21:p. 1]
Section L of the RFP consisted of the instructions,
conditions and notices to offerors. In addition to the normal
instructions usually found in this section, the drafter
included a set of situational problems. These problems were
designed to provide scenarios for the contractors to respond
to. These responses would be evaluated in the Evaluation/
Selection phase. An example of one of the situational
problems is:
A tactical system which has the potential of causing loss
of life is currently undergoing a modification which will
affect 25 percent of the system's capabilities. The
software is written in a unique language for which no
coding standards exist. Specify techniques beyond
walkthroughs, reviews, audits, and test that you would
apply to evaluate the software. How would you develop
evaluation criteria? [Ref. 22 :p. 8]
Section M of the RFP included the Evaluation factors
for award. Technical evaluation criteria was approved as part
of an Evaluation Factors Business Clearance. The weighting of
technical versus cost was 80% and 20% respectively. According
to the NARSUP 15.605(90) , cost must carry a weight of not less
than 40% unless thoroughly justified. This was justified by
APM in the document listed above. The APM determined that it
was necessary to weigh technical over cost/price in this
manner due to the highly technical nature of software
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development and the need for quality, and qualified personnel
up front. In the justification, the APM claimed:
Lessons learned have repeatedly proven that software
development and post deployment software support are
extremely sensitive to the quality of the workforce
performing the work . . . . The software industry is
currently facing a shortage of qualified personnel. This
makes quality personnel extremely valuable as well as more
expensive than unqualified personnel. A proposal which is
less expensive, though technically acceptable can be
indicative of less qualified personnel. [Ref. 23 :p. 1]
The final draft of the SOW was received from the APM
and the RFP was released on 12 Jan, 1989. The date for
closing the offer was originally given as 24 February but was
extended to 24 March, 1989 with the first modification to the
solicitation issued 15 Feb, 1989. A second modification was
issued to amend the solicitation in order to incorporate
changes that were brought about by questions that were raised
during the pre-proposal conference. This will be the subject
of the next section.
3. Pre-proposal Conference
A pre-proposal conference was announced on 18 January
1989 to all the bidders who responded to the CBD by requesting
the solicitation package. The announcement stated that
technical and contract requirements were to be discussed at
the conference. Additionally, prepared answers to any
previously submitted questions would be delivered to those
attending the conference. There would also be a question and
answer period during the conference to field any new questions
that were raised.
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Out of 117 companies on the mailing list who received
the RFP, only 17 showed up at the pre-proposal conference.
Review of the questions submitted to the PCO prior to the
conference revealed that questions concerning the 10,000 man-
hour level of effort listed in the RFP were a common theme.
In response to one question, the answer offered on the
prepared sheet was as follows:
The most likely level of effort, and therefore the level
of effort used for evaluation is 10,000 hours for each of
five years that will include a base year and four (4)
option years. The offeror shall propose an appropriate
mix of personnel based on a level of effort of 10,000 man-
hours per 12 month period. The level of effort contracted
for may actually vary from 4,000 man-hours to 24,000 man-
hours for each 12 month period under contract. [Ref.
24:p. 1]
The answer presented in the quote above was referred
to as the answer for several other questions concerning the
proposed level of effort. For example, one of the most direct
questions pertaining to this issue was asked by one party
during the conference. He asked:
Is the 10,000 man-hours a ceiling requirement? Will the
10,000 hours increase, and if so, by how many? How much
of increase can there be and still be within the scope of
the contract? Please clarify. [Ref. 24 :p. 1]
Once again, the answer that was given above, was referred to
(in a formal response mailed out to the attendees after the
conference) . However, this did not address the area of Scope
of Contract as asked. The issue of the level of effort was
brought up again during the conference. Initially, a reply
was given that the 10,000 level could go up, but not by more
than 5,000 man-hours. In addition, attendees were told that
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the level of effort could not double without increasing the
SOW. These responses were superseded by the formal written
response to the question, but still, this did not address the
issue of Scope of Contract. This will be presented in the
next chapter as one of the prevailing issues of this contract,
since the contract was immediately modified to well over any
amount eluded to during the conference.
C. EVALUATION AND SELECTION
1. Evaluation
Out of the 17 firms that attended the pre-proposal
conference, only two responded to the solicitation. These
were, the ORINCON corporation, and the Computer Systems
Development Corporation (DSDC) . A technical evaluation board
(TEB) was convened at MTCSSA and consisted of a chairman from
the APM's office and three other members who were employees of
MCTSSA. The proposals were evaluated against the evaluation
criteria identified in Section M of the RFP. This section
indicated that the contract award would be made to that
offeror whose proposal was determined to be the most
advantageous to the Government, cost and other factors
considered. In addition, they were to be evaluated by adding
the offeror's proposal on option quantities to the basic
quantities for the first year.
The evaluation was conducted in two areas. Area I
consisted of the responses to the situational problems. Area
II consisted of evaluations on Corporate Experience, Personnel
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Qualifications, SOW Tasks Execution, Management Structure, and
Tools and Techniques. A numerical scoring system was used
during this evaluation, with the corresponding area given
either an outstanding, excellent, good, fair, or unacceptable,
depending on where the score fell. For instance, a score of
101 to 125 would be given an outstanding, 76-100 an excellent,
and so on.
2. Selection
The evaluation found CSDC's proposal to be unaccept-
able. CSDC failed to demonstrate an understanding of, and
experience in, software support environment with their
responses to the situational problems, the discussion of the
SOW tasks, management structure, and the qualifications of
their personnel. In addition, they failed to meet the
requirement of having a site located within one hour surface
commute to MCTSSA. While CSDC's corporate headquarters is in
Virginia, CSDC claimed to have an office in the Camp Pendleton
area but failed to establish the relationship between this
office and the corporate headquarters. The impression of the
board was that most of the support would be conducted out of
the headquarters and not from the local office, as was
required by the proposal. The personnel that were identified
by CSDC were contingency hires and it was determined that if
they could not execute the hiring of these personnel, there
would be serious deficiencies in qualified personnel to
provide the Government support.
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ORINCON's proposal on the other hand was found to be
fully acceptable. The board found that ORINCON had the
capability to far exceed the minimum performance expectations
under the contract by demonstrating that they had the
knowledge, background, and personnel to provide the required
support services needed. The immediate capability to support
MCTSSA was critical as the ULCS program neared full
production, with fielding of all systems rapidly approaching.
CSDC was removed from consideration for contract award
upon recommendation from the TEB. The Contracting Officer was
left with only one responsive and responsible offeror.
D. THE CONTRACT
After considering the question of what type of contract to
use on this procurement, the Contracting Officer, decided that
it would be a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract and
justified it with the D&F mentioned previously. According to
the MCRDAC Contracting Officer, this was the first time that
a CPFF contract was used for this type of service. In the
past, the office had used Basic Ordering Agreements (BOAs) and
Indefinite Quantity Contracts (IQCs) . [Ref . 25]
The CPFF contract was awarded on 3 July, 1989. The
negotiated settlement for deliverables 0001 through 0003 of
the contract were as follows:
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ITEM 0002 MATERIALS 90,000.00
ITEM 0003 TRAVEL AND PER DIEM 80,000.00
TOTAL ESTIMATED CPFF $ 545,358.00
Items 0004 through 0006 pertained to technical data for which
no specified price was negotiated. Items 0007 through 0012,
0013 through 0018, 0019 through 0024, and 0025 through 0030
represented the four option years on items 0001 through 0006.
This contract would be incrementally funded as stated in
the Limitation of Government Obligation clause found in
Section H of the contract. An initial amount of $235,000 was
available immediately while additional funds were to be
applied using modifications to the basic contract. Contractor
performance would be initiated by Technical Task Directives
(TTDs) submitted to the contractor by the COTR. As long as
there was money available, the COTR could issue TTDs to
intitiate contractor performance. More will be discussed on
this issue in the next chapter.
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V. IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS
The most significant problems identified in this case
study were revealed during the post-award/contract adminis-
tration phase. These problems can be traced back to the SOW,
the type and wording of the contract, and the lack of a
sufficient plan for contract administration. These three
causes are found to be a recurring theme throughout this
chapter. While it would be difficult to forsee every possible
problem associated with service contracting, it is felt that
the problems identified could have been avoided through a
reasonable amount of effort during the early stages of the
contract cycle.
There are four general areas in which the major problems
were identified. These are categorized as:




3. Material Purchases (Contracting out Contracting)
4 Personal Services
A. SCOPE OF CONTRACT
Out of all the problems listed above, this one had the
greatest ability to affect the contract, had the initial
offerors become aware of the situation and filed a protest.
In a letter from MCTSSA to MCRDAC, sent only one month after
award, MCTSSA personnel requested that the man-hour estimate,
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listed under item 0001 of the contract, be increased to 60,000
hours, up from 10,000. This represented an increase of 50,000
hours or 500%. In addition, it was requested that the
materials listed under item 0002 be increased from $90,000 to
$1,250,000 and travel under item 0003 be increased from
$80,000 to $400,000. These increases were approved by a
modification to the contract dated 6 September 1989. This was
just over two months after contract award. As a result of the
increase in man-hours, the estimated associated cost was
increased from $347,554 by $1,453,796 to a new estimated cost
of $1,801,350. Since the Fixed Fee for worked performed under
this contract was negotiated at a percentage of estimated
labor costs, it too would increase. The total Fixed Fee was
thereby increased from $27,804 by $116,304 to a new total
Fixed Fee of $144,108. [Ref. 16:p. 2]
The controversy over this particular modification concerns
the timing of it, as well as the actual level of the increase
itself. In addition, this particular modification was minor
compared to other modifications that were eventually approved
during the performance of the contract. For example, the
initial contract was funded at $545,358.00, but through
subsequent modifications, it was eventually increased to
approximately $4.6 million, primarily due to man-hour and
material increases.
Several questions come to mind when considering the nature
of this particular problem. These are:
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1. By what quantity could a Contracting Officer increase
the estimated level of effort and still remain within
the scope of the contract?
2
.
How many other offerors would have submitted bids if the
estimated hours were listed at 60,000 in lieu of 10,000?
3 Was the initial increase in the man-hour estimate
brought to the attention of the Contracting Officer
before award? If so, why was the contract awarded; if
not, why wasn't it?
In response to the first question, it is first necessary
to define Scope of Contract . The scope of a contract is
basically the range or limit of work that was originally and
mutually agreed upon by the parties of the contract when the
contract was awarded. A contract modification that is
specifically authorized by the contract is considered to be
within the scope of the contract. The Changes Clause in a
contract is the normal means for implementing contract changes
in this case. Changes that are considered within the scope of
the contract are changes to drawings, designs, and
specification; method of shipment or packing; place of
delivery; services to be performed; time of performance; and
place of performance.
Changes outside the scope of the contract are called
Cardinal Changes. The changes clause does not authorize a
cardinal change. A definition from the Claims Court is as
follows:
A cardinal change occurs when the Government effects an
alteration in the work so drastic that is effectively
requires the contractor to perform duties materially
different from those originally bargained for. By
definition, then, a cardinal changes is so profound that
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it is not redressable under the contract, and thus renders
the Government in breach. [Ref. 26 :p. 94]
Usually, when the Government orders cardinal changes, the
party to disagree and thus protest the change is the
contractor. However, in this situation there was no dispute
between the Government and contractor, and the latter agreed
to perform the change. For this situation, a different test
can be applied, especially when other vendors protest the
change. Here, the Comptroller General must determine if the
modification materially changes the contract for which
competition was held [Ref. 26:p. 95]. If it is found that
this be the case, then the Government would have to compete
the new requirement.
.
When considering this, and comparing it to the immediate
situation, it appears that by increasing the level of effort
and material amounts to the extent that was actually done, the
scope of the contract has been breached. This is emphasized
by a letter from Assistant Counsel to Counsel concerning one
modification:
... at some point, the increase in the quantity (not the
nature) of the work performed under the contract will go
beyond the scope of the contract. [Ref. 27: p. 2]
When considering the second question listed above, several
important points come to mind. First, the question of hours
was asked in the pre-bid conference by one of the potential
offerors. However, no legitimate response was given. The
lack of an appropriate response from the Government raises
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some concern. This point is emphasized by the same memo from
counsel mentioned above:
Would a reasonable offeror have anticipated that the work
performed under the contract would be six times what was
reflected in the RFP? Ten times? Twenty times? I think we
should keep this in mind when dealing with future actions
on this contract. [Ref. 27 :p. 2]
It would appear that there would have been a greater response
to the RFP, had other companies known that this contract would
eventually call for a considerably greater amount of effort,
and thus become more lucrative. This, in turn, might have
resulted in a better price to the Government through increased
competition.
The second point to consider is the risk of protest to
which the Government was subjected. Although there was no
protest filed against the award of this contract, it was a
real possibility. The APM was in a position that called for
immediate support of the program. Any protest action
resulting in the delay of contractor performance would have
been detrimental to the program. To determine whether or not
any of the non-responding contractors would have protested,
the researcher considered contacting a few of them, but was
strongly urged not to by a Government employee.
Considering that a delay in the procurement action would
seriously impact the program, it would be easy to assume the
answer to the third question. That is, the APM would not want
to bring knowledge of an increased requirement to the
attention of the Contracting Officer before award for fear of
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having it held up for recompetition. In reality, this seems
plausible. In other words, it could have been the intention
of the APM to purposely withhold the knowledge of the
increasing requirements from the PCO in order to avoid
delaying the award of the contract. Once the contract was in
place, the APM could simply have it modified to allow for the
support of the increasing requirements. As was mentioned in
the third chapter, this contract was originally let to support
the ULCS project, but additional projects requiring the same
type of support were added to the roles of the APM. Due to
this, the estimated level of effort increased, and the APM
sought to have software support for these projects conducted
in accordance with this contract. Since the contract was a
cost reimbursement type, this would not be a problem, as long
as there were funds available and the action requested was
consistent with the general tasks outlined in the SOW.
The unusual characteristics of this case which led to the
researcher's opinion that the scope of the contract was
violated, are summarized as follows: 1) This is a cost
reimbursable contract for which there is no limit to the
number of hours it can cover. 2) The COTR can submit TTDs as
long as there is funding available, and as long as the task is
covered by the SOW. This was not difficult since there was
always enough money, and the SOW was vague enough to cover
just about any software related task one would venture to
write. 3) Scope of Contract became an issue because the
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contract was utilized as an Indefinite Delivery contract
instead of a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee contract. Eventually, the
increase in quantity of work performed would go beyond the
scope of the contract, simply because of the way it was
designed. As a result, the new requirements should have been
recompeted.
B. GENERAL CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION
Proper contract administration is essential for ensuring
that both the Government and the contractor meet the terms of
the contract. In addition, it is equally important for
ensuring that both parties observe all the laws and regula-
tions pertaining to Government contracts. One way for
ensuring the success of this area is to establish a contract
administration plan. According to a Federal Contracts Report
regarding the latest OFPP Policy Letter, 91-2, a nonexistent
or inadequate contract administration plan was one of the main
reasons given for the cause of common problems found with
service contracts [Ref. 2:p. 501].
Careful review of the contract files and interviews with
various personnel revealed that there was not a formal
contract administration plan for the ORINCON contract. It is
the researcher's opinion that this led to the following
problems, which are somewhat related:
* Insufficient guidance/supervision of COTR
* Insufficient training of COTR
* Improper contractor invoicing
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1. Insufficient Guidance/Supervision of COTR
As was addressed in the previous chapter, the method
established for initiating contractor performance was the
Technical Task Directive (TTD) . The COTR had the power to
initiate and approve the TTD. Whenever a new requirement
developed, all the COTR had to do was to issue the TTD to the
Contractor, citing the applicable SOW task. The Contractor
would respond to the TTD by providing an estimate of the costs
to perform such a task. The COTR would then have the ability
to obligate the Government for funds covering the TTD.
Because of this, the COTR was given enormous power under this
contract. To complicate matters, the organizational structure
of the COMM/INTEL division of MCTSSA was such that the COTR
reported to the Division Director as the ULCS Project Officer
(PO) . This represented an extraordinary conflict of interest.
The ULCS Project Officer was being evaluated as a PO and not
as a COTR, therefore, it was in the COTR's best interest to
ensure that the mission was accomplished. Being both the COTR
and the PO, made it easy to ensure that any requirement this
person had as a PO would be processed without having to be
screened by cognizant contracting personnel outside the
operational chain of command.
Because of this relationship, careful guidance/super-
vision of the COTR was necessary in order to ensure that sound
contract administration procedures were followed, and that as
a PO, the individual was not using the contract
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inappropriately. Due to the geographical separation between
the Contracting Officer and MCTSSA, DCMAO San Diego was
assigned the CAO responsibilities according to the contract,
but did not provide any type of administrative cross-check on
the TTDs executed. They simply certified TTDs for payment.
In effect, the COTR, who was not trained in contracting, had
unsupervised control when executing the deliverables on this
contract.
2. Insufficient Training of COTR
The amount of success that an individual realizes in
the day to day performance of his/her duties, is directly
proportional to the amount of training that person receives.
In order for an individual to function both efficiently and
effectively as a COTR, it is paramount that the desired level
of training required of such a position is achieved. In
addition to possessing a solid technical background in the
area for which the services are to be provided, the COTR must
also be an experienced business manager. Formal training
coupled with contract management experience cannot be
overemphasized. The more complex the service contract, the
more experience the COTR should have. The researcher feels
that the while the COTR did possess the level of technical
expertise required, the official did not have the necessary
contract management experience. In a discussion with the
COTR, it was found that this person had not received even the
minimal amount of training for the position, the Department of
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the Navy's COTR course [Ref. 28]. If there had been an
adequate plan for contract administration, there would have
been provisions made to ensure that an individual with proper
contract experience and training was assigned as the COTR.
3. Improper Invoicing
Due to the lack of experience in handling contracts of
this nature, the COTR was not proficient in processing
contractor invoices in the manner that is required under a
cost type contract. In this case, invoices were not itemized
by the contractor for submitted expenses such as travel and
certain equipment purchases. [Ref. 29]
C. MATERIAL PURCHASES
This section deals with three issues, which are:
1. The types and amounts of material purchased under this
service contract,
2. The method by which it was obtained,
3. The relationship of the problem to the contract.
Under normal circumstances, service contracts permit the
use of contractor purchased supplies to be used during the
performance of the contract. These supplies are often
referred to as consumables and are allowable costs for reim-
bursement under cost type contracts. However, there are some
instances where the nature of the work to be performed
requires the use of capital equipment, and other assets, in
addition to consumables. To the maximum extent possible, the
U.S. Government should provide these assets to the contractor
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as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) . By doing so, the
Government reduces the overall costs of the contract by
avoiding the use of contractor owned equipment.
In some instances, the Government has existing equipment
on hand to furnish to the contractor, in other cases it must
be procured first. There can also be circumstances when, as
a result of a Government issued task, the contractor deter-
mines that it must procure the necessary hardware for its use
in performing that task. The Government can then permit the
contractor to purchase the equipment by issuing a modifi-
cation to the contract. The contractor however, is required
to follow Government regulations and is held to the same
restrictions pertaining to competitive procurement when it
purchases the equipment for the Government. Once purchased,
the Contractor Acquired Property is charged against the
contract and is utilized as GFE during the life of the
contract.
During the performance of the ORINCON contract, there were
two modifications increasing the amount authorized under
Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) 0002, Materials. The
original amount negotiated for CLIN 0002 was $90,000, but was
subsequently increased to $2.3 million to allow the contractor
to purchase hardware for the Government.
One of the most significant purchases was the result of a
TTD directing the contractor to purchase and deliver four (4)
Intelligence Analysis Center Modification Kits. This purchase
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alone accounted for $1.2 million of the increase under CLIN
0002. As a result, there were additional costs associated
with allowing the contractor to purchase this equipment.
These costs are reflected by sales taxes and material handling
charges that were eventually passed on to the Government.
These charges would not have had to be paid if this equipment
had been purchased by the Government.
The circumstances leading to the eventual approval of this
purchase were embodied in the fact that both PCO and Govern-
ment Counsel felt the requirement fell within the tasks
outlined in the SOW. Counsel responded to the PCO's question
of whether this fell within the scope of the contract by
stating:
[The contract] requires modification of hardware and
software, hardware and software system analysis and the
installation and verification of hardware and software
"functionality". I think this means the contractor has to
make any changes to the hardware and software which are
required to make the developed systems work. [Ref. 27: p.
1]
Considering that both the PCO and Counsel had difficulty
applying meaning to the SOW, it is evident that the document
was not self-explanatory, thus it had the potential to cause
misunderstanding
.
Another controversial issue regarding equipment purchased
as a result of a TTD, surrounded the purchase of computer
hardware manufactured in Japan by the NKK Corporation. By
proceeding with this procurement, the contractor violated the
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provisions of the Buy American Act. Specifically the Act
states:
The Buy American Act requires that only domestic end
products be acquired for public use, except articles,
material, and supplies:
1. For use outside the U.S;
2. For which the cost would be unreasonable, as determined
in accordance with 25.105;
3
.
For which the Agency Head determines that domestic
preference would be inconsistent with public interest;
4. That are not mined, produced, or manufactured in
the U.S. in sufficient and reasonable available
commercial quantities, of a satisfactory quality
(see 25. 108) ; or
5. Purchased specifically for commissary resale. [Ref . 6: p.
25-1]
.
In addition to the hardware purchased from NKK, the TTD
specified purchasing equipment from the Toshiba Corporation.
Toshiba is on the U.S. Government's debarred list of contrac-
tors from which the Government cannot procure equipment. This
policy is specified in the Multilateral Export Control
Enhancement Amendments Act (P.L. 100-418) of August 23, 1988,
and implemented by FAR 25.1002, 52.225-12 and 52.225-13.
These particular problems are directly related to the
Material clause found in Section H of the contract.
Basically, this clause allows the contractor to be reimbursed
for material specifically identified in each TTD, but there
was nothing governing the type and amount of materials to be
purchased. Because the Materials Clause was so open-ended, it
allowed the Government to use the contract as a buying
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service. In addition, there are individuals who felt that
it was the intent of the Agency to circumvent Government
procurement channels by having the contractor purchase the
equipment. This in effect violated the principle of OMB
Circular A-76. By having the contractor purchase equipment on
a regular basis, the Agency was effectually contracting out an
inherently Governmental function. Also, once again the issues
that were discussed in part A concerning cardinal changes and
scope of contract apply here as well.
D. PERSONAL SERVICES
All service contracts can be categorized as either
Personal Services or Nonpersonal Services . Nonpersonal
services contracts are those contracts in which the personnel
performing the service are not subject to the supervision and
control of the Government. According to the FAR, Part 37,
•"Personal services contract' means a contract that, by its
express terms or as administered, makes the contractor person-
nel appear, in effect, Government employees." [Ref. 6:p. 37-
1] Therefore, with limited exception, personal services
contracts are not permitted.
In accordance with the FAR, all service contracts must
have a Determination of Nonpersonal Services (DNS) conducted
prior to award of any such contract. On this contract, a DNS
was submitted by the APM and certified by the Contracting
Officer who determined it to be in compliance with the FAR.
Despite this, there were two instances of personal services
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identified during this analysis. The first one being the case
of a contractor employee who ordered, tracked, and receipted
for Government property. In addition, Government property
accounting records were being maintained by this individual.
This person was hired to provide administrative support to the
contractors on sight, but ended up performing inherently
Governmental functions, and taking direction from Government
employees. The second case consisted of a contractor employee
who actually served as a secretary for the Government,
performing all the usual tasks of a secretary and taking
direction from a Government employee. [Ref. 29]
The problem of personal services, as it applies here, can
be attributed to two of the areas identified at the beginning
of this chapter; lack of proper contract administration and a
poorly written SOW. It is evident how the lack of proper
administration would allow the Government/contractor rela-
tionship to slip into a personal services mode. But what is
not so clear is how this problem could be attributed to the
SOW. More importantly how can this be avoided when developing
the SOW? One would think that if personal services are
prohibited, the simple elimination of any such task from the
SOW should be enough to avoid encountering this problem. But
therein lies the difficulty. It is not readily apparent what
task may constitute personal services in all instances. As
CDR Rodney Matsushima put it in his thesis,
The distinction between personal and non-personal services
is not always clear and many factors are considered in
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reaching a determination as to whether a particular
service, situation, contract, or contract performance is
personal or non-personal in nature. [Ref. 12: p. 13]
The case of the secretary was a clear violation of the
FAR. No additional amount of effort placed on writing the SOW
could have prevented this, however, extra measures could have
prevented the case of the other contractor employee performing
personal services. As was mentioned, the tasks in the SOW
were written in a very general manner, to the point of being
vague. This loophole enabled the contractor to hire an
individual for administrative support purposes under the guise
of the necessity to accomplish a vaguely written task. Once
hired, this person became available to perform other functions
under the direction of Government personnel. If the Job
Analysis function was performed in accordance with the
directives, and with proper supervision during contract
administration, these problems could have been avoided.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL
As was indicated in the introduction to this thesis, many
problems experienced during contract administration have their
roots in the pre-solicitation phases of the contract cycle.
Most of these problems can be avoided by planning properly,
developing a proper SOW, using the appropriate type of
contract, and by ensuring that mistakes made in the past are
not repeated. The basic thrust of this thesis has been to
analyze the contract in order to identify and analyze the main
difficulties that were experienced, then provide recommenda-
tions for future solicitations in hopes that they will not be
repeated.
This chapter will begin by addressing the Primary and
Subsidiary research questions, and making recommendations
based on the findings. The chapter will conclude by
suggesting areas for further research.
B. PRIMARY QUESTION
1. What were the principal problems experienced in the
pre-solicitation, award, and post award phases of the
ORINCON service contract for the Marine Corps and how
might these problems be avoided in future service
contracts?
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This case study identified three pre-award causes that
led to several post-award difficulties. These were: 1) that
the SOW was insufficiently prepared which led to the parties'
misinterpretation of it, 2) that a poorly written, unrecog-
nized, hybrid contract was used, and 3) the lack of a good
contract administration plan.
The post award problems that came about as a result of
one or more of the causes listed above are identified as: 1)
modifications constituting cardinal changes beyond the scope
of the contract, 2) poor guidance/supervision of the COTR, 3)
material purchases that violated regulations and caused
management problems, and 4) the problem of personal services.
2 . Recommendations
a. SOW
(1) Develop the SOW in accordance with the
guidelines outlined in Chapter II of this thesis, wording it
in such a way that only one interpretation of it is possible.
(2) Use a team approach involving all parties
concerned with contractor performance. (See Subsidiary ques-
tion #2, below)
.
(3) Utilize a draft solicitation to assist in
refining the SOW.
(4) Allow sufficient time for proper planning and
the completion of the above.
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b. The Contract
(1) One problem with this CPFF contract was that
it was not constrained by a minimum or maximum number of man-
hours. Therefore it is recommended that minimum and maximum
limits be established on the number of manhours to be
performed. Any requirement that would exceed the maximum
limit would have to be recompeted. There is a bill proposed
by U.S Representative John Conyers, Jr. that would establish
controls on substantial modifications of contracts. According
to the proposal, any modification that would provide substan-
tially more materials or services than called for in the
original contract, would be held up until the Agency issued a
solicitation for proposals to determine if other options would
be more advantageous to the Government. [Ref. 30: pp. 2-3]
(2) Use individual delivery orders to initiate
contractor performance in lieu of TTDs. These delivery orders
would be initiated by the COTR, but would be negotiated by the
Contracting Officer.
(3) Include an invoicing clause that directs the
contractor to break out the invoices by task. In addition,
the contractor must invoice everything that is purchased under
the contract so the COTR has a means to maintain control.
Ensure that every invoice is reviewed by the appropriately
assigned CAO.
(4) Establish limits on the types and amounts of
material to be purchased under this contract as well as citing
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the applicable clauses for the Buy American Act, and Multi-
lateral Export Control Enhancement Amendments Act. In
addition, include references to rules pertaining to Contractor
purchase of ADP equipment as outlined in FIKMR 201-01.103.
(5) A Personal Services Clause should be included
in the contract, identifying the nature of such services and
their prohibition from Government contracts.
c. Contract Administration Plan
(1) Develop a plan to ensure proper selection of
the COTR. The COTR should have sufficient experience in the
administration of contracts of this nature.
(2) The plan should provide for continuous COTR
training, including the requirement to read and maintain the
new GSA handbook titled A Guide For Contracting Officer 's
Technical Representatives . In addition, the plan should
provide a system of checks to avoid conflicts of interest
within the Government organization, such as the COTR working
for the Project Officer.
(3) The Plan should provide for proper control
and accountability of GFE purchased by the contractor in
accordance with the contract.
(4) The Plan should provide a system for
reviewing positions held by contractor employees, and their
associated responsibilities, to ensure that personal services
are not being performed.
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C. SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS
1. What is a Services Statement of Work and how is it
prepared?
The SOW and how it should be prepared was addressed in
the second chapter. Once again the recommendations for this
SOW are listed above.
2. What were the requirements, who determined them and
how were they developed for this contract?
The requirements were identified in Chapter IV, on
page 35. The researcher feels that the requirements were
properly identified but not properly incorporated into the
SOW. It is recommended that a Services Planning Team be
developed early as soon as the need for the service is
identified. This team, headed by a Senior COTR, will consist
of the APM and other technical personnel, Contracting Officer,
Financial/Cost Analyst, Market Research specialist, and
finally legal counsel. Involving this team in the require-
ments determination process early on will enable a smooth
transition into the development of the SOW.
3. What was the overall plan (including milestones) for
this contract and to what extent did actual execution of the
contract meet this plan?
There was no formal plan for this contract. There was
an attempt to have the contract awarded by January, 1989,
however the contract was awarded on 3 July, 1989. It is
recommended that a formal plan with milestones be established
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by the Services Planning Team mentioned above, in order to
assure timely and effective execution of all the phases of the
contract cycle.
4. How effectively were modifications implemented on this
contract?
As on 1 July, 1991, 19 modifications to the contract
had been conducted. For the most part these modifications
were initiated to reflect additional funding that was being
incrementally applied to the contract. However, two of the
modifications concerned man-hour and material increases the
researcher felt were cardinal changes, and thus outside the
scope of the contract.
It is recommended that no modification be performed if
it could reasonably be construed as being outside the scope of
the contract.
5. What changes could be made to future solicitations for
services contracts to enhance effectiveness?
The researcher strongly recommends using a draft
solicitation to incorporate recommendations from potential
offerors. The extra time required to send out a draft would
be offset by the time saved from the avoidance of problems
associated with a faulty solicitation.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Using surveys, seek input from the contracting community
to develop a proper contract administration plan that
could be implemented on service contracts.
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2. Develop procedures for establishing the Services
Planning Team as well as developing a guidebook for the
team to use to put an effective contract together.
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